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1. Introduction
A recurring problem arises in construction contracts when an owner
requires changed or extra work or delays a project without concurrently
adjusting the contract price to compensate the contractor for the increased
cost of performance. By failing to make the adjustment, the owner effectively
requires the contractor to finance the changed, extra, or additional project
work. In these situations it is both foreseeable and likely that the contractor
will borrow money to finance the additional work. This unanticipated bor-
rowing often requires the contractor to incur increased financing expenses,
including interest paid to the lender. This cost of borrowing, or interest
paid on the borrowed funds, is a direct cost of performing the changed or
additional work and, consequently, should be recoverable.
Federal courts once permitted contractors to recover the cost of borrowing
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in limited instances as part of an equitable adjustment.' Regulatory develop-
ments during the past forty years, however, have created uncertainty among
government contractors as to whether interest on borrowings may be recov-
ered under any circumstances.2
This Article provides an historical perspective on the development of
the law related to contractors' recovery of the cost of borrowing. It analyzes
the current state of the law and examines the direct conflict between federal
regulatory provisions and the principle of equitable adjustment. Finally, this
Article critiques judicial decisions that have denied government contractors'
claims to recover the cost of borrowing and compares them with decisions
that have granted recovery for the cost of borrowing as an element of con-
struction damages in state and local governments as well as private party
disputes.
II. Interest "On a Claim" vs. Interest as a Cost of Performance
Interest for government delay in the payment of amounts due a contractor
is referred to as interest "on a claim." 3 Generally, absent an express statutory
or contract provision, this type of interest is unrecoverable from the United
States.4 Federal statutes, such as 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a), reflect this principle,
providing that "[i]nterest on a claim against the United States shall be allowed
in a judgment of the United States Court of Federal Claims only under a con-
tract or Act of Congress expressly providing for payments thereof."5 Although
the language of the statute refers only to Court of Claims6 decisions, the statute
1. See, e.g., Gevyn Constr. Corp. v. United States, 827 F.2d 752, 754-55 (Fed. Cir.
1987); S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 729, 731 (1981); Dravo Corp.
v. United States, 594 F.2d 842, 849 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Singer Co. v. United States, 568
F.2d 695, 718 (Ct. CI. 1977); Framlau Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 687, 694 (Ct.
Cl. 1977); Bell v. United States, 404 F.2d 975, 984 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Hoffman Constr. Co.
v. United States, 7 CI. Ct. 518, 528 (1985); Entwistle Co. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct.
281, 287-88 (1984).
2. See FAR 31.102, 31.205-17; ASPR 15-106 (1976 ed.) (July 1, 1976), 15-205.17 (1960
ed.) (July 1, 1960); FPR 1-15.106, 1-15.205-17.
3. See W. Robert Buxton et al., Payment Delay Claims, in PROVING AND PRICING
CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS 336 (Robert F. Cushman and David A. Carpenter eds., 1990);
1 FED. CONT. MOT. (MB) 7.10(3), at 7-142 (1996).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1994); see also United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel
Co., 329 U.S. 585, 588 (1947); Mar-Pak Corp. v. United States, 203 Ct. CI. 718, 720
(1973); Komatsu Mfg. Co. v. United States, 131 F. Supp. 949,950 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Ramsey
v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 353, 356 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a).
6. The Court of Claims has undergone several name changes over its history. The
United States Claims Court succeeded the U.S. Court of Claims as a result of the Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 27 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 171 (1988)). Congress enacted the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506, on October 29, 1992, and changed the name of the U.S.
Claims Court to the U. S. Court of Federal Claims. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims
succeeded the U.S. Claims Court in all respects.
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also applies to suits in federal district court and appeals before boards of con-
tract appeals.
7
After the enactment of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA),8 how-
ever, federal entities could not claim immunity from paying interest on
monetary claims for governmental delay in payment. 9 The CDA provides
contractors with relief in the form of "prejudgment" interest on claims from
the date the claims are submitted to the Contracting Officer until the date the
contractor actually receives payment from the Government.° Prejudgment
interest is designed to compensate a contractor wrongfully denied its funds
for a period of time.
Courts often confuse prejudgment interest with an entity's cost of bor-
rowing because of the label "interest."' 1 Unlike prejudgment interest, how-
ever, the cost of borrowing is a direct cost incurred by a contractor asked
to perform extra work. 2 The cost of borrowing funds, therefore, represents
a separate cost that should be recoverable independent of and in addition
to prejudgment interest. Whereas prejudgment interest statutes exist because
the Government, as sovereign, must waive its immunity from paying interest
on claims, a statute addressing the cost of borrowing is unnecessary because
the cost of borrowing is a direct cost incurred by a contractor in performing
extra work.
Despite the confusion, federal courts have distinguished between award-
ing damages for prejudgment interest and awarding damages for the cost of
borrowing to complete extra work. In Havens Steel Co. v. Randolph Engineering
Co.'3 the court awarded a contractor its contract damages, including the
interest the contractor paid on monies borrowed to finance additional
work. 14 The court's opinion emphasized "that this [was] not an effort to
calculate or impose prejudgment interest."' 5 Similarly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit distinguished between the award
of prejudgment interest and the cost of borrowed funds in Nebraska Public
Power District v. Austin Power, Inc. 16 The Nebraska court itemized the plain-
7. See United States v. 106.64 Acres of Land, 264 F. Supp. 199, 202 (D. Neb. 1967);
Fruehauf Corp., PSBCA No. 197, 76-1 BCA 11,771, at 56,189.
8. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1994).
9. See 41 U.S.C. § 611 (1994).
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir.
1991); Granite Constr. Co., ENG BCA No. 5849, 93-1 BCA 25,450 (discussing the
Government's sovereign immunity from liability for prejudgment interest).
12. See Buxton et al., supra note 3, at 338; 1 FED. CONT. MGT. (MB) 7.10(1), at
7-141 (1996); Richard C. Walters, The Matter of Interest in Federal Government Contracting,
14 PUB. CON. L.J. 96, 97-100 (1983).
13. 613 F. Supp. 514 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd, 813 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1987).
14. See id. at 542.
15. Id.
16. 773 F.2d 960, 973 (8th Cir. 1985).
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tiff's claims and listed the cost of borrowed funds separately from the prejudg-
ment interest.
17
State courts have also addressed the difference between awards for pre-
judgment interest and awards for the cost of borrowing to finance additional
work. In Martel Construction, Inc. v. Montana' 8 a construction company
brought an action against the state of Montana seeking damages for increased
costs, including interest payments on borrowed funds used to finance addi-
tional work.' 9 The court held that although "payments made by Martel
[the contractor] to its bank were in the form of interest, they are part
of its actual damages, subject to the appropriate proof, and not 'interest'
chargeable against the State as prohibited by [Montana's anti-prejudgment
interest statute]." °
Ill. Interest on Borrowings Under Federal Law
A. Federal Case Law Development
In the federal procurement arena, Bell v. United States21 is the most widely
cited opinion recognizing the validity of claims for the cost of borrowings
as a direct cost of additional work.22 In Bell a contractor incurred interest
on borrowing as a result of production delays caused by government-ordered
contract changes. 23 The Government argued that 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a)24
precluded the allowance of interest as part of the equitable adjustment.25
The court noted, however, that the Department of Defense (DoD) changed
its policy in 1954 to allow the cost of borrowing as part of equitable adjust-
ments under fixed-price contracts and that since 1954 a large number of
Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) decisions allowed such
interest.2 6 The court held this "long-standing practice allowable and not in
conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a)," explaining that:
[t]he statute and its policy apply to demands for damages in "breach"
claims against the United States where the plaintiff seeks compensation
for delay in payment. The demand here is not based upon a "breach" but
upon a change compensable under the "Changes" article.. .. Extra interest
17. See id. at 970 n.10.
18. 817 P.2d 677 (Mont. 1991).
19. See id. at 677-78.
20. Id. at 681.
21. 404 F.2d 975 (Ct. CI. 1968).
22. See id. at 984-85.
23. See id. at 978-80, 984.
24. See id. at 984. As discussed above, 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) (1964) prohibited any
interest on a successful claim against the United States unless provided for under contract
or by statute.
25. See Bell, 404 F.2d at 984.
26. See id. (citing Kaman Aircraft Corp., ASBCA No. 10141, 66-1 BCA 5581, at
26,081).
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on the borrowed money became due... and under generally accepted princi-
ples was undoubtedly an increased cost of contract performance attributable to
the change. 27
The court concluded that "[i]ncreased costs on borrowed money could be
'in the very same category as more tangible costs of construction.' Con-
versely, the amounts sought by these plaintiffs are not compensation for
the Government's delay in making payment."
2 8
Subsequent decisions by the Court of Claims followed the rationale devel-
oped in Bell but imposed greater restrictions on the contractor's burden of
proof.29 In Framlau Corp. v. United States30 the court held that contractors
must demonstrate a nexus between the interest on a specific borrowing and
the changed work. 31 The contractor in Framlau failed to prove what portion,
if any, of its borrowings could be traced to performance changes ordered
by the Government. Consequently, the court denied recovery of interest.32
In Singer Co. v. United States33 the Court of Claims recognized two types
of factual situations in which a party could recover its cost of borrowing.
34
The first scenario, referenced above, involves "a specific loan undertaken
in order to finance the changed work. 3 5 The second instance typically
involves a more complex business environment in which a company has
regular dealings with lending institutions for general business borrowings.
In Singer the contractor, Librascope, was a division in a complex corporate
structure.36 Librascope borrowed all the funds necessary to perform the
contract from its parent corporation, General Precision, Inc. (GPI). GPI was
funded by its parent corporation, General Precision Equipment Corporation
(GPEC).37 The evidence indicated that GPEC supported its own cash de-
mands, as well as those of GPI and Librascope, by borrowing from banks
and other lending institutions. 3' The Singer court focused solely upon the
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. Id. (quoting Phillips Constr. Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d 538, 540 (Ct. Cl.
1967)).
29. See, e.g., S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 729, 731 (1981); Dravo
Corp. v. United States, 594 F.2d 842, 849 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Singer Co. v. United States,
568 F.2d 695, 718 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Framlau Corp. v. United States, 568 F.2d 687, 694
(Ct. Cl. 1977); Entwistle Co. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 281, 287-88 (1984).
30. 568 F.2d 687 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
31. See id. at 694.
32. See id. at 694 n.17 (explaining that "it is doubtful that plaintiff could show any
borrowing was necessitated by such a small increase in contracts costs as was here ap-
proved for changes").
33. 568 F.2d 695 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
34. See id. at 718.
35. See id. (citing Bell v. United States, 404 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl. 1968)); Aeronca Mfg.
Corp., ASBCA No. 9173, 69-2 BCA 7811.
36. See Singer Co. v. United States, F.2d 695, 718-19 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
37. See id. at 718.
38. See id.
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interest on GPEC's borrowings because those borrowings were the ultimate
source of Librascope's funds.39
The court held that the contractor failed to offer specific and detailed
evidence demonstrating that the Government's action increased GPEC's
borrowing needs.40 According to the court:
the record does not disclose the nature of the various transactions that com-
prised the total of that company's annual indebtedness (its course of bor-
rowing), it does not disclose the company's cash position or the changes in
that position during the 3-year period in question nor does it disclose the
manner in which Librascope's capital demands were satisfied by General
Precision Equipment Corporation-whether by cash (surplus), by new bor-
rowings or simply by extending past borrowings through added interest pay-
ments.
41
The court, therefore, declined to award the contractor its costs of borrowing.
A similar evidentiary problem arose in Dravo Corp. v. United States.42 In
that case the plaintiff, Dravo, was a corporation with worldwide operations
and more than twenty-five separate business divisions. 43 One of Dravo's
subordinate organizations, Western Construction Division (Western), man-
aged a number of construction projects, including the project in dispute.44
Dravo collected the proceeds from the various divisional projects and placed
them into a "fungible pot" from which they were redistributed as necessary.45
The cumulative monetary situations of the various divisions at any given
time determined the extent of Dravo's outside borrowing. 46 Thus, whether
Western borrowed funds to finance additional work depended upon the
cash situation of the other divisions. 47
Dravo argued that even if it was unable to identify the category of bor-
rowed capital used to pay for the particular changed work, recovery should
be granted where the mere fact of financing was undisputed. 48 The Court
of Claims, however, declined to follow the ASBCA's "evolutionary pattern"
of lowering the contractor's burden of proof and continued to require that
a contractor establish a clear necessity for increased borrowings occasioned
by the change. 49 In holding that the plaintiff had failed to prove this clear
necessity, the court stated that "[a] mere showing of a history of business
39. See id.
40. See id. at 720.
41. Id. at 719-20.
42. 594 F.2d 842, 848-49 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
43. See id. at 843.
44. See id. at 845.
45. See id. at 848.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 849.
49. See id. For examples of this "evolutionary pattern" see Ingalls Shipbuilding Div.,
ASBCA No. 17717, 76-1 BCA 11,851; Aerojet-General Corp., ASBCA No. 17171,
74-2 BCA 10,863; Keco Indus., Inc., ASBCA No. 15131, 72-1 BCA 9262.
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borrowings and a course of dealings with various banks during the time
frame at issue is insufficient to prove a claim for interest."5 Thus, although
the court recognized that interest paid on borrowings was an actual perfor-
mance cost that could be recoverable as part of an equitable adjustment, 51
the burden of proof was difficult for contractors, particularly complex corpo-
rations, to meet.
52
In S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States53 the Court of Claims clarified
its earlier decisions in Bell, Singer, and Dravo by holding that a contractor
could recover the additional interest paid or incurred on existing loans
as a direct result of the Government's delay.5 4 Various boards of contract
appeals had interpreted Bell, Singer, and Dravo as limiting a contractor's
ability to recover interest to borrowings incurred or increased as a result of
the need for new loans to finance a contract change or government-caused
delay.55 In Silberblatt, however, the Court of Claims determined that
interest expenses incurred on existing indebtedness were also compensa-
ble under the "suspension of work" clause unless the contractor would
have paid or incurred the interest even without the delay.5 6 Essentially,
the Court of Claims expanded upon the instances in which interest pay-
ments could be recovered. 7
B. Imputed Interest on Equity Capital
Although the court in Bell addressed the recovery of interest on actual
borrowings, or debt capital, the court did not address the issue of whether
imputed interest should be recognized when contractors use their own equity
capital to finance additional performance costs. Two arguments support the
recoverability of an imputed cost for use of equity capital. First, by using their
own equity capital to finance changes in a government contract, contractors
forego opportunities to earn actual interest by investing the equity capital.5 8
Second, the "decision to use equity capital to finance current capital acquisi-
tions or operations may necessitate actual borrowing to finance subsequent
acquisitions and operations."
5 9
50. Dravo, 594 F.2d at 849 (citing Singer Co. v. United States, 568 F.2d 695, 718-19
(Ct. CI. 1977)).
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Gevyn Constr. Corp. v. United States 827 F.2d 752, 754-55 (Fed. Cir.
1987); Dravo, 594 F.2d at 848 (citing Singer, 568 F.2d at 718-19; Gulf Contracting, Inc.
v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 525, 531 (1991)).
53. 228 Ct. Cl. 729 (1981).
54. See id. at 731.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Dravo Corp. v. United States, 594 F.2d 842, 849 (Ct. Cl. 1979); see also JOHN
CIBINIC, JR. AND RALPH C. NASH, JR., COST-REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTING 647 (2d ed.
1993).
59. CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 59, at 647.
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A line of board of contract appeals decisions in the 19 70s permitted
recovery of imputed interest either as an actual cost item or as additional
profit in the computation of equitable adjustments for changed work.6 The
Court of Claims, however, declined to follow the decisions that allowed
the recovery of interest on equity capital. In Framlau Corp. v. United States61
the court refused to distinguish between interest on debt capital and interest
on equity capital.62 Initially, the contractor's claim in Framlau was based
upon interest on borrowings. 63 After failing to prove that any of its bor-
rowings were directly attributable to compensable changes, the contractor
made an alternative argument that interest should be recoverable without
regard to whether debt or equity capital was used to finance the changes. 64
The court, however, rejected this approach, stating that:
[iut may be argued that differing treatment of debt and equity capital follows
an artificial distinction and that it rewards thin capitalization, but we are
constrained by the statute discussed earlier [28 U.S.C. § 2516(a)] and further
believe that the distinction is supported by reason in that the cost to the
contractor of borrowing capital is clearly determinable, while the value to
him of the use of equity capital is not so readily ascertainable.65
In Dravo, the Court of Claims dealt extensively with the issue of interest
on equity capital.66 There, the contractor contended that in the event it
was not entitled to recover its interest costs on a debt capital (borrowing)
theory, it should be compensated for the loss incurred as a result of the use
of its equity capital to finance the changed work.67 The court acknowledged
the unfairness of the situation, explaining that a contractor using its own
money for changed work without immediate reimbursement will obviously
incur a cost. 68 The court also recognized that denying such recovery may
draw an artificial distinction between smaller companies that are entirely
debt capitalized and larger, more complex corporations that may use both
equity and capital. 69 Nevertheless, the court felt constrained by both its
earlier decision in Framlau and its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2516(a) and
60. See Lockheed Shipbuilding and Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 18460, 77-1 BCA
12,458; Bailfield Indus., Inc., ASBCA Nos. 13418, 13555, 17241, 77-1 BCA 12,308;
Fischbach & Moore Int'l Corp., ASBCA No. 18146, 77-1 BCA 12,300, aff'd, 617
F.2d 223 (Ct. Cl. 1980); New York Shipbuilding Co., ASBCA No. 16164, 76-2 BCA
11,979; Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., ASBCA No. 17717,76-1 BCA 11,851; Aerojet-Gen.
Corp., ASBCA No. 17171, 74-2 BCA 10,863.
61. 568 F.2d 687 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
62. See id. at 694-95.
63. See id. at 694.
64. See id.
65. Id. at 694-95.
66. See Dravo Corp. v. United States, 594 F.2d 842, 849 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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concluded that it was not "free to substitute its view of what the law ought
to be; that function [was] reserved for the Congress. '"7
After Dravo, the agency boards of contract appeals retreated from their
stance that imputed interest on equity capital was properly recoverable.
71
The ASBCA, however, issued one aberrant decision in 1982. In Blue Cross
and Blue Shield Association (of Pennsylvania)72 the board allowed a contractor
to recover the cost of equity capital used to purchase or build equipment
and facilities because it was an actual incurred cost of contract performance.
73
The ASBCA has subsequently restricted the Pennsylvania Blue Shield holding
to its facts because a unique clause in the contract at issue 74 failed to incorpo-
rate standard cost principles. 75 The holding in Dravo, precluding the recovery
of imputed interest where a contractor uses its own equity capital to finance
project changes, reflects the current state of the law in both the courts and
the boards.
C. Federal Regulations and the Pricing of Adjustments Clause
As discussed in Bell, in 1954 the DoD changed its long-standing policy
by allowing "interest on borrowings, as part of equitable adjustments under
fixed-price contracts." 76 In 1970, however, the DoD issued Defense Procure-
ment Circular No. 79, which eliminated the policy of paying interest as
part of a contract price adjustment. 77 The circular, effective July 1, 1970,
mandated that a new "Pricing of Adjustments" clause be included in all of
the DoD's standard fixed-price contracts. 78 According to the "Pricing of
Adjustments" provision:
[w]hen costs are a factor in any determination of a contract price adjustment
pursuant to the Changes clause or any other provision of this contract,
such costs shall be in accordance with Section XV of the Armed Services
Procurement Regulation as in effect on the date of this contract.
79
70. Id. at 850.
71. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics Corp., ASBCA No. 42540,92-2 BCA 24,902;
Fletcher & Sons, Inc., VABCA No. 3248, 92-1 BCA 24,726; Washington Patrol Serv.,
ASBCA No. 26470, 82-2 BCA 15,846; Owen L. Schwam Constr. Co., ASBCA No.
22407, 79-2 BCA 13,919.
72. ASBCA No. 21113, 82-2 BCA 15,966.
73. See id.
74. The provision allowed for recovery of "actual, necessary, accrued expenses, deter-
mined by the corporations .. . incurred in connection with the administration of [the]
contract." Id. at 79,139 (emphasis added).
75. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield, ASBCA No. 32240,87-1 BCA 19,510, at 98,619
(discussing the interpretation of the special contract provision and resultant limitation of
the decision).
76. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
77. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Defense Procurement Circular No. 79 (May 15, 1970).
78. See id.
79. ASPR 7-103.26 (1976 ed., Rev 8) (Sept. 30, 1970).
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The provision required that the cost principles set forth in the Armed
Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) section 15, part 2 govern all price
adjustments including "equitable adjustments" under such provisions as the
Standard "Changes" and "Differing Site Conditions" clauses as well as other
"adjustments" (such as those negotiated under the "Suspension of Work"
clause in construction contracts).80 Those cost principles, previously only
applicable to cost-reimbursement contracts, expressly provided that interest
on borrowings, however represented, was not an allowable cost.
The Federal Procurement Regulation (FPR) was similarly revised on
March 7, 1972, to include a "Pricing of Adjustments" clause mandating
application of the cost principles to negotiated adjustments under fixed-price
contracts. 81 As a result, all price adjustments became subject to the cost
principles' specific disallowance of interest on borrowings.8" The FPR revision
became effective on September 21, 1972.83
Therefore, under federal regulations a contractor could not recover inter-
est on borrowings under any fixed-price government contract awarded be-
tween September 21, 1972, and April 1, 1984, when the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) went into effect. Consequently, the rule established in
Bell and developed in subsequent Court of Claims decisions was inapplicable
to contracts executed between 1972 and 1984.84
In at least two decisions, however, the U.S. Claims Court entertained
the possibility of allowing the cost of borrowing as part of an equitable
adjustment if the contractor met the requisite burden of proof.85 In Hyman
Construction Co. v. United States8 6 the plaintiff entered into a construction
contract with the Veteran's Administration (VA) on September 30, 1980,
under which the VA issued several change orders requiring the plaintiff to
perform additional work.87 The court determined that "[i]f plaintiff borrowed
money to finance the change order work, and thus incurred an additional
interest expense, then such an added interest cost may well be a compensable
increase in the cost of performance which would entitle plaintiff to an equita-
ble adjustment." ' Ultimately, the court held that the plaintiff was not enti-
tled to recover the interest on borrowings because plaintiff failed to meet
its burden of proof and because change orders issued by the defendant for
amounts proposed by the plaintiff constituted an accord and satisfaction
between the parties. 89 Significantly, the court never discussed whether the
80. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 78; ASPR 7-602.38.
81. See FPR 1-15.106; see also NASA PR 15.106.
82. See FPR 1-15.205-17; see also NASA PR 15.205-17.
83. See 37 Fed. Reg. 5295, 5296 (1972).
84. See Fletcher & Sons, Inc., VABCA No. 3248, 92-1 BCA 24,726, at 123,408.
85. See Gulf Contracting, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 525, 530-31 (1991); Hyman
Constr. Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 518, 528-29 (1985).
86. 7 Cl. Ct. 518 (1985).
87. See id. at 520.
88. Id. at 528 (citing Bell v. United States, 404 F.2d 975, 984 (Ct. Cl. 1968)).
89. See id. at 528-29.
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FPR's Pricing of Adjustments Clause and resultant cost principles should
have governed any and all pricing adjustments.
The court in Gulf Contracting, Inc. v. United States,90 on the other hand,
acknowledged the federal regulations that existed at the time the contract
was awarded on May 19, 1975 by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
91
Specifically, the court held that ASPR 15-205.17 precluded the recovery of
interest on borrowings by the contractor and subcontractor.9" The court still
recognized, however, that the contractor and subcontractor were entitled to
recover interest on borrowings as long as they established the necessary
linkage between the changed work and the borrowings under "Claims Court
precedent., 93 Thus, although the federal regulations explicitly disallowed
interest on borrowings during this time period, the Claims Court circum-
vented those regulations and adhered to the precedent established in cost-of-
borrowing cases. Consequently, the Claims Court created further confusion
among government contractors.
D. The FAR and the Current State of the Law
When the FAR was published in 1984, the Pricing of Adjustments clause
was not incorporated into its provisions. As a result, the issue of recovering
the cost of borrowing has become more complex and confusing.94 Under
the FAR's cost principles, interest on borrowings, however represented, is
an unallowable CoSt. 95 Although there is no question that the cost principles
are incorporated into cost-reimbursement contracts,96 it is unclear whether
the cost principles are applicable to fixed-price contracts under the FAR.
The general language of FAR 31.102 provides the sole basis for applying
the cost principles to adjustments in fixed-price contracts:97
The applicable subparts of Part 31 shall be used in the pricing of fixed-price
contracts, subcontracts, and modifications to contracts and subcontracts
whenever (a) cost analysis is performed, or (b) a fixed-price contract clause
requires the determination or negotiation of costs. However, application of
cost principles to fixed-price contracts and subcontracts shall not be construed
as a requirement to negotiate agreements on individual elements of cost in
arriving at agreement on the total price. The final price accepted by the
parties reflects agreement only on the total price. Further, notwithstanding
the mandatory use of cost principles, the objective will continue to be to
90. 23 CI. Ct. 525 (1991).
91. See id. at 526-31.
92. See id. at 530-31.
93. See id. at 531.
94. See RALPH C. NASH, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT CHANGES 16-38 (1989).
95. See FAR 31.205-20.
96. See FAR 52.216-7.
97. See John Cibinic, Jr., Cost Principles and Fixed Price Contract Adjustments: Strange
Bedfellows, 4 NASH & CIBINIC REP. 66 (Nov. 1990).
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negotiate prices that are fair and reasonable, cost and other factors consid-
ered.98
Three agencies have resolved this ambiguity by mandating the use of
the Pricing of Adjustments99 clause in fixed-price contracts similar to those
adopted by the ASPR and FPR. The Department of Health and Human
Services Acquisition Regulation (HHSAR) provides that the FAR cost prin-
ciples apply to price adjustments under the Changes clause or any provision
of this contract."'
1
The Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) 252.243-7001 is somewhat broader, stating that "[w]hen costs
are a factor in any price adjustment under this contract, the contract cost
principles and procedures in FAR Part 31 and DFARS Part 231, in effect
on the date of this contract, apply."10 1 This clause, as well as the virtually
identical General Services Administration Acquisition Regulation (GSAR)
552.243, appear to "apply to any type of price adjustment, whether or not
provided for in a contract clause ... includ[ing] actions for breach of con-
tract damages or other adjustments, such as correction of mistakes."'' 0 2 The
HHSAR provision, on the other hand, would only pertain to price adjust-
ments covered by a contract clause.l13 Regardless of each provision's possible
breadth, the Pricing of Adjustments clause renders the FAR's cost principles'
disallowance of interest applicable to DoD, HHS, or GSA fixed-price con-
tracts. 104
When a contractor signs a contract with DoD, HHS, or GSA, the contrac-
tor agrees to be bound by the cost principles through the mandatory Pricing
of Adjustments clause in the contract. If a contract does not contain a
Pricing of Adjustments clause, the cost principles should not be binding on
the contractor. FAR 31.102 is the only FAR provision that applies the
cost principles to fixed-price contracts. This language is not directed at
contractors but rather at the Contracting Officer. Furthermore, the provi-
sion "is not incorporated by reference into fixed price contracts."'0 5 If the
contractor never agreed to be bound by the FAR's cost principles, the FAR's
specific provision denying the recovery of interest on borrowings should
not apply. Arguably, if a contract is not subject to the cost principles,
98. FAR 31.102.
99. See GSAR 543.205, 552.243-70; HHSAR 352.270-4; DFARS 243.205-71, 252.243-
7001. The DFARS provision is entitled "Pricing of Contract Modifications." As the
language of the clause is essentially the same as that in the Pricing of Adjustments clause,
it will be referred to as the Pricing of Adjustments clause in this Article.
100. See HHSAR 352.270-4.
101. DFARS 252.243-7001.
102. Cibinic, supra note 98, 66.
103. See id.
104. See Davis Group, Inc., ASBCA No. 48431, 95-2 BCA 27,702; Tayag Bros.
Enters., Inc., ASBCA No. 42097, 94-3 BCA 26,962; Tomahawk Constr. Co. ASBCA
No. 45071, 94-1 BCA 26,312.
105. See Cibinic, supra note 98, 66.
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interest on borrowings may properly be included in an equitable adjustment
pursuant to Bell and its progeny.
Neither the courts nor the boards have dealt with this issue directly.
The most analogous situation was addressed by the Postal Service Board
of Contract Appeals in Automation Fabricators & Engineering Co. 106 In addi-
tion to containing the standard "Changes" clause for fixed-price supply
contracts, the contract also contained a Pricing of Adjustments clause, which
stated that:
[w]hen costs are a factor in any determination of a contract price adjustment
pursuant to the "Changes" clause or any other provisions of this contract,
section 15 of the Postal Contracting Manual, as in effect on the date of
this contract, shall serve as a guide in negotiation of such contract price
adjustments. 1 0 7
Under section 15, entitled "Contract Cost Principles and Procedures,"
interest on borrowings was an unallowable cost. The board, however, deter-
mined that absent more definitive language in the contract and regulations,
section 15 was only intended to guide the negotiation of equitable adjust-
ments."°8 The board also recognized that a contractor's right to recover
extra interest expenses incurred on borrowings due to a government-directed
change had been clearly established by the courts and boards.' 9 Accord-
ingly, the board held that the contractor was entitled to recover its interest
expenses as part of the contractor's equitable adjustment under the Changes
clause."
]0
E. Conflicting Provisions and Principles
The Government purportedly is committed to the concept of "equitable
adjustment," as evidenced by the language of the Changes clause in the
FAR."' According to the clause, if the CO alters the contract and "causes
an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for, performance
of any part of the work under [the] contract, whether or not changed by
the order, the Contracting Officer shall make an equitable adjustment in
the contract price ... and shall modify the contract.""
2
The Changes clause, as well as the general concept of equitable adjust-
ments, directly conflict with the cost principles' specific disallowance of
interest. 1"' The Government's long-standing refusal to award the cost of
borrowing was designed to treat all of its contractors consistently, irrespective
106. PSBCA No. 2701, 90-3 BCA 22,943.
107. Id. at 115,163.
108. See id. at 115,165.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See FAR 52.243-1.
112. FAR 52.243-1(b).
113. See FAR 31.205-20.
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of their different financing methods."1 4 Although the Government seeks to
avoid creating inequality among contractors by refusing to recognize interest
on borrowings as a direct cost, contractors firmly believe that "a cost is a
cost, and interest is a cost.""
5
The disallowance of this interest cost has raised concerns among govern-
ment contractors because interest expenses have increased substantially in
recent years."l6 Further, the ideological and practical purposes of the "equita-
ble adjustment" mechanism are not being served. In Bruce Construction Corp.
v. United States" 7 the Court of Claims discussed the purpose of equitable
adjustments:
Equitable adjustments ... are simply corrective measures utilized to keep a
contractor whole when the Government modifies a contract. Since the pur-
pose underlying such adjustments is to safeguard the contractor against in-
creased costs engendered by the modification, it appears patent that the
measure of damages cannot be the value received by the Government but
must be more closely related to and contingent upon the altered position in
which the contractor finds himself by reason of the modification."
8
The Bruce court firmly established that the proper measure of an equitable
adjustment is based upon the contractor's actual costs. Thus, routine denial
of a contractor's financing expenses in connection with equitable adjust-
ments is unjustifiable. The Court of Claims determined in Bell that the cost
of borrowing is as tangible a cost of construction as is the cost of extra
materials, equipment, and labor to perform the changed work." 9 Indeed,
when a "contractor has been compelled to perform the work with its own
money ... there can be no equitable adjustment to the contractor until
the contractor recovers the entire cost of the additional work."' 20 A contract
adjustment that excludes interest on borrowings is, therefore, not only ineq-
uitable but also fails to satisfy the purported objective of equitable adjust-
ments-keeping the contractor whole.
Furthermore, by contracting with the Federal Government, contractors
find themselves in a particularly unique position. Under provisions such as
the Changes and Disputes clauses, contractors must continue to perform
their contracts as directed by the Government without stopping to litigate.121
The contractors only recourse is to dispute the amount of the equitable
adjustment at a later date. 22
114. See H. Robert Weiss, Recovery of Interest Expense in Defense Industry: The Problem
and a Possible Solution, 6 NAT. CONT. MGT. J. 25, 30 (1972).
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. 324 F.2d 516 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
118. Id. at 518.
119. See Phillips Constr. v. United States, 374 F.2d 538, 540 (Ct. CI. 1967).
120. See S. REP. No. 95-1118 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235.
121. See id.
122. See id.
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IV. The Recoverability of Interest on Borrowings Under State Law
As discussed above, an equitable adjustment under the Changes clause is
intended to fully compensate a contractor for any contract modifications that
occur. The Federal Government has implemented provisions such as the
Changes and Suspension of Work clauses in order to avoid liability for breach
of contract when effecting contract modifications, which inevitably arise.
State and local government contracts, as well as private contracts, often
contain remedy-granting provisions similar to the Changes and Suspension
of Work clauses found in federal government contracts. When the contracts
do not incorporate such clauses, courts typically award contractors damages
under generally accepted breach of contract principles for performing addi-
tional work and incurring expenses not originally provided for in the con-
tracts.' Although the federal and state theories for allowing recovery are
different, the same underlying principles apply. Both the "equitable adjust-
ment" mechanism and breach of contract damages are intended to place
contracting parties in the same position in which they would have been
but for the change order or the breach, respectively.
A. Contracting with State and Local Government Entities
Contractors have sought to recover their cost of borrowing from either
state or local government entities in a limited number of cases. 124 In each in-
stance courts have recognized interest paid on construction loans as a recover-
able item of damages once certain criteria are met. Although different courts
apply varied standards, in general, the contractor must prove: (1) a breach of
the contract through changed work or delays to the project; (2) the contrac-
tor's need to borrow additional funds; and (3) the amount of the borrowings
and actual interest incurred with a reasonable degree of certainty.
125
Additionally, some courts have relied more stringently upon the require-
ment of foreseeability.126 In order to demonstrate foreseeability, a contractor
must establish that the parties either contemplated the borrowing at the
time of contracting or reasonably foresaw the probable result of the breach.
Often, courts will deny recovery of legitimate damages on the grounds of
lack of foreseeability.1
27
123. See, e.g., Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. Austin Power, Inc., 773 F.2d 960 (8th
Cit. 1985); Mendoyoma, Inc. v. County of Mendocino, 87 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970); Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 414 N.E.2d 1274
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
124. See, e.g., Nebraska Pub. Power, 773 F.2d at 972-73; Mendoyoma, 87 Cal. Rptr. at
743-45; Bates & Rogers, 414 N.E.2d at 1278; Martel Constr., Inc. v. Montana, 817 P.2d
677, 679-81 (Mont. 1991); State Highway Comm'n v. Brasel & Sims Constr. Co., 688
P.2d 871, 881 (Wyo. 1984).
125. See Nebraska Pub. Power, 773 F.2d at 972-73.
126. See Mendoyoma, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
127. See id.
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In Nebraska Public Power District v. Austin Power, Inc.128 Austin Power,
Inc. contracted with the Nebraska Public Power District, a public corpora-
tion and political subdivision of the State of Nebraska, to construct an
electrical power plant.'29 The court held that Austin had sufficiently estab-
lished that its loans and interest expenses resulted from Nebraska Power's
contract breaches, which delayed the project and caused cost overruns.130
Austin also proved that it borrowed $25 million from its parent corporation,
which in turn borrowed the required funds from a bank to cover Austin's
shortage and, as a result, incurred $4.7 million in interest costs.13'
The court then looked to Nebraska law to determine whether the cost
of borrowed funds is recoverable. 32 No Nebraska case had previously
addressed the issue, and, consequently, the court gave "great weight to
the district court's holding that the state courts would be receptive toward
allowing full compensation for actual damages arising from contract
breaches."' 33 The court affirmed the district court's decision to present the
jury with the issue of whether the contractor was entitled to recover its cost
of borrowing. 34 As a result, the court further held that the jury's decision
to award the cost as an element of damages was entirely consistent with
the evidence presented.
13
In Martel Construction, Inc. v. State of Montana 36 a construction company
brought an action against the State of Montana seeking damages for breach
of contract, including interest expenses paid on borrowed funds to finance
extra work. 137 Due to errors in the state's contract drawings, the state re-
quired the company to perform additional work not contemplated under
the contract. 38 The court held that other than the prohibition against
prejudgment and postjudgment interest, the state was liable for damages in
contract cases to the same extent as private litigants under similar circum-
stances. 39 Relying upon previous holdings, the court permitted Martel to
recover funds borrowed to finance additional work to the extent that the
damages were "ascertainable in both nature and origin and [could] be caus-
ally and foreseeably related to the State's breach of contract.
' ' 40
128. 773 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1985).
129. See id. at 962.
130. See id. at 973.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id. (citing New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Mitchell, 325 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1963)
(applying Georgia law); Cal-Val Constr. Co. v. Mazur, 636 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Mo. App.
1982); Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 214 S.E.2d 155 (Va. 1975)).
134. See id. at 972-73, 976.
135. See id. at 964, 972-73, 976.
136. 817 P.2d 677 (Mont. 1991).
137. See id. at 677-79.
138. See id. at 678.
139. See id. at 679.
140. See id. at 680-81 (citing Popp v. Gountanis, 718 P.2d 340 (Mont. 1986); Lee v.
Andres, 667 P.2d 919 (Mont. 1983); Bolz v. Meyers, 651 P.2d 606 (Mont. 1982)).
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California law similarly indicates that interest on funds borrowed to
finance extra work may be recovered if certain criteria are met. For instance,
in Mendoyoma, Inc. v. County of Mendocino'4' a plaintiff corporation entered
into a contract with the county to construct and operate facilities on public
land.142 The trial court concluded that, as a result of the county's breaches,
the plaintiff properly treated a concession agreement as being terminated.143
In its proposal the plaintiffs method of performance financing consisted of
issuing shares of common stock in the company.144 The plaintiff was forced,
however, to finance the project through loans because the lack of project
development prohibited issuance of the stock.' As a result, the plaintiff
submitted a claim for approximately $14,000, which represented the interest
paid on the loans to finance its performance. 146 The trial court rejected the
claim on the grounds that the loans were not reasonably necessary for
performance of the contract work.
The appellate court disagreed with the trial court's reasoning, suggesting
that costs of borrowing are a legitimate cost to the contractor. 147 The court
ultimately denied recovery, however, concluding that the parties did not
contemplate the loan method of financing at the time of contracting. 48 This
decision implies that the cost of funding would have been recovered had
the contractor financed the extra costs through a more traditional (and
thus foreseeable) financial arrangement.
Because most contracts do not affirmatively represent the particular man-
ner of funding, the foreseeability element has not been viewed by the courts
as an impossible hurdle for a contractor to overcome. The Wyoming Su-
preme Court, for instance, considers interest paid on borrowed funds necessi-
tated by defective specifications to be within the contemplation of the par-
ties.'49 In State Highway Commission of Wyoming v. Brasel & Sims Construction
Co. 150 the court stated that "[i]nterest paid on funds borrowed to maintain
liquidity has been considered a normal and foreseeable incident arising from
a breach of contract and, therefore, compensable as damages.''. Although
the contractor borrowed funds to finance its entire operation, the funds
141. 87 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
142. See id. at 742.
143. See id. The concession agreement between the plaintiff and the county made the
plaintiff a licensee of the county and gave the plaintiff the right to construct buildings
and improvements for the service of the public and to operate them for profit for a
certain period of time. See id.
144. See id. at 744.
145. See id. at 743.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 743-44.
149. See State Highway Comm'n v. Brasel & Sims Constr. Co., 688 P.2d 871, 881
(Wyo. 1984).
150. 688 P.2d 871 (Wyo. 1984).
151. Id. at 881 (citing Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal,
Inc., 339 A.2d 302 (Md. App. Ct. 1975)).
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from all of its projects were commingled. The court would have awarded
the contractor the interest paid on borrowed funds had the amounts claimed
been less speculative.
152
A court may not award damages based only upon conjecture. When a
contractor has demonstrated that the state or local government entity has
breached its contract by burdening the performance of the work, however,
courts have recognized that the interest paid on borrowed funds to finance
that additional work constitutes a legitimate cost of the work itself. Conse-
quently, such courts have held that the only way to fully compensate the
contractor for the breach of contract is to include the cost of borrowing as
an element of actual damages.
B. Contracts Between Private Parties
The private sector has long considered interest on borrowings to be an
actual loss to the contractor.' 53 In contracts between private parties, numer-
ous courts have held that a party that breaches its construction contract
by requiring additional work or extending the project completion date is
obligated to pay the interest on borrowings that result from that breach. 154
Not only do these decisions elaborate upon the criteria discussed above,
but they also recognize the underlying rationale for awarding such damages,
in contrast to cases in which the Federal Government is a party.
For instance, in Havens Steel, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri awarded interest paid on monies borrowed to
finance additional work under two different theories: (1) ordinary contract
damage rules, and (2) the language of a contract document evidencing the
"practical equivalent" of an "equitable adjustment" provision. 155 The court
recognized that it was not only foreseeable but also inevitable that increased
costs from additional work without an equivalent increase in progress pay-
ments would force the contractor to borrow additional funds or use its own
capital. 5 6 According to the court, the contractor would incur an actual loss
in either case.157 Furthermore, the court only required that a contractor
152. See id.
153. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 820
(1962).
154. See, e.g., Havens Steel Co. v. Randolph Eng'g Co., 813 F.2d 186, 188-89 (8th
Cir. 1987) (applying Missouri law); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Mitchell, 325 F.2d 474,
475 (5th Cir. 1963) (applying Georgia law); Chestnut Hill Dev. Corp. v. Otis Elevator
Co., 739 F. Supp. 692, 701-03 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Massachusetts law); Hemenway
Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So. 2d 1356, 1358-60 (La. Ct. App. 1979); Nickerson v. Rowe,
647 A.2d 1191, 1192 (Me. 1994); Cal-Val Constr. Co. v. Mazur, 636 S.W.2d 391, 392
(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Quate v. Caudle, 381 S.E.2d 842, 843-46 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989);
Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 214 S.E.2d 155, 160-61 (Va. 1975); Singer
v. Etherington, 789 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
155. See id. at 541.
156. See id.
157. See id.
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have some reasonable way of determining its borrowing cost in order to
recover.
158
In Quate v. Caudle159 the court addressed whether homeowners were enti-
tled to recover the cost of borrowing additional funds to complete their home
after the contractor breached the construction contract. 160 The homeowners
were forced to pay another contractor sums that exceeded the original con-
tract price in order to complete construction."6 Although this case involved
owners rather than contractors seeking to recover interest paid on borrowed
funds, the rationale for awarding the interest as an element of damages is the
same. According to the court, "[a] damage award consisting of merely the
principal amount of a loan and not including financing costs and interest
charges for obtaining that loan will not 'restore the victim to his original condi-
tion ... as far as it may be done by compensation in money.' " 162
The Supreme Court of Virginia similarly held that the interest costs of
an extended term of borrowing resulting from unexcused delay constituted
compensable, direct damages.' 63 In Roanoke Hospital Association v. Doyle &
Russell, Inc. 164 the court recognized that it was customary for construction
contracts to require third-party financing.165 Since the term of construction
financing was ordinarily extended when completion of the project was de-
layed, the court concluded that the interest costs incurred "during such an
extended term [were] predictable results of the delay ... .
The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts adopted the
reasoning developed in Roanoke.167 In Chestnut Hill Development Corp. v.
Otis Elevator Co.168 the owner of a condominium complex brought an action
against its subcontractor to recover interest charges on loans incurred as a
result of construction delays. 169 Concluding that the borrowing costs were
direct damages, the court stated that:
158. See id. at 542.
159. 381 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
160. See id. at 843.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 846 (quoting Phillips v. Chesson, 58 S.E.2d 343, 347 (N.C. 1950)); see also
Hemenway Co. v. Bartex, Inc., 373 So. 2d 1356, 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that
interest on borrowings must be awarded as an item of damages in order for the plaintiff
to be placed in the same position plaintiff would have been in had the construction
been timely completed); Cal-Val Constr. Co. v. Mazur, 636 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982) (concluding that Missouri courts consider the recovery of interest paid on
borrowings to be an integral part of plaintiff's damages).
163. See Roanoke Hosp. Ass'n v. Doyle & Russell, Inc., 214 S.E.2d 155, 160-61 (Va.
1975).
164. 214 S.E.2d 155 (Va. 1975).
165. See id. at 160-61.
166. See id. at 161.
167. Chestnut Hill Dev. Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 739 F. Supp. 692, 702 (D. Mass.
1990).
168. 739 F. Supp. 692 (D. Mass 1990).
169. See id. at 693-94, 702.
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when the installation of elevators is delayed, thus delaying completion of a
construction project, extended financing costs flow naturally from the delay.
Financing costs, such as interest charges on construction loans, are closely
related to a subcontract for the installation of elevators in a condominium
project under construction.170
Courts adjudicating private construction disputes have recognized that inter-
est costs paid on funds borrowed to finance extra work are a direct cost to
contractors and should be recoverable in actions for breach of contract.
V. Conclusion
The cost of borrowing funds to perform additional work is an actual cost
incurred by contractors. Through high standards and burdens of proof,
however, the current federal policy fails to compensate contractors equitably
by limiting the occasions in which contractors can recover interest on bor-
rowings. In failing to reform its policies to incorporate the standards and
rationales adopted by both state governments and private entities, the Fed-
eral Government continues to send a strong message, without any basis,
that it will not treat its contractors equitably.
The Federal Government's failure to recognize the reality that funds must
often be borrowed to finance extra work results in contractors including
contingencies in their bids to cover this possibility. The Competition in
Contracting Act (CICA)171 is premised upon the theory that fairness and
equality in competition results in the best quality product at the lowest
price. Any federal policy that results in the inclusion of contingencies defeats
the premise underlying CICA. Thus, the Government's refusal to include
the cost of borrowed funds in damage awards is inconsistent with other
principles of Government contracting. Until these inconsistencies are elimi-
nated, the Government will not obtain the best product for the best price,
and contractors will continue to be treated unfairly.
170. Id. at 703.
171. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1175-1203 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C., 40 U.S.C., and 41 U.S.C.).
